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Global Imbalances from the Historical Perspective 
Marcela Veselkova  
Abstract: »Globale Ungleichgewichte aus historischer Perspektive«. This pa-
per examines the global imbalances in two eras of globalization. The main fo-
cus is on the medium-run factors that determine the current account balances. 
The results suggest that relatively rich countries with developed financial mar-
kets, high quality institutions and high proportion of dependent persons tend to 
run current account deficits (or lower surpluses) in both periods. On the other 
hand, the high initial level of net foreign assets increases the current account 
balance. This holds especially in the prewar period. The government budget 
balance has a positive effect on the current account balance in some instances. 
In the prewar period, the government budget balance plays the role only in the 
short-run, suggesting the importance of the short-run fluctuations in the current 
account balance. The twin deficits hypothesis plays a more important role in 
the second era of the globalization. However, it holds only for developing 
countries. These results suggest that the twin deficit hypothesis and the global 
savings glut hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. 
Keywords: global imbalances, historical comparison, panel regressions. 
1. Introduction 
The past decade was marked by the puzzling development in the international 
economy. In 1999 the developing world as a whole stopped running current 
account deficits (Wolf 2009, 39). On the other hand, the United States, the 
world’s largest economy and the major military power, started running the 
current account deficit of an unprecedented size. In 2006, the U.S. current 
account deficit reached its low of 6 percent of GDP or 803.5 billion USD in 
absolute terms (WEO 2009). Surprisingly, this deficit was financed mostly by 
the developing countries in East Asia and oil-exporters. The phenomenon was 
termed the global imbalances. 
The current debate surrounding the global imbalances typically contrasts 
two views: the twin deficit hypothesis and the savings glut hypothesis. The 
former asserts that the large U.S. current account deficit is the result of the 
large budget deficit; the latter argues that the U.S. current account deficit is 
driven by the savings glut in the rest of the world. These excess savings are 
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then channeled to the world’s deepest and the most liquid financial markets, 
which happen to be in the United States. 
The global imbalances took place also in the past globalization process. Be-
tween 1870 and 1913, a period known as the first era of globalization, Britain 
ran an average current account surplus of 4.5 percent of GDP. At the eve of the 
World War I, this surplus reached an astonishing value of 8.6 percent of GDP. 
France and Germany, the second and the third biggest creditors of the period, 
ran the surplus of 3.3 and 1.3 percent respectively during the 14 years running 
to the World War I. These large current account surpluses were matched by the 
persistent current account deficits of the countries in the New World but also in 
Northern or Eastern Europe. For example, Canada and Australia ran current 
account deficits of more than 7 percent of GDP between 1870 and 1913 (all 
data come from Taylor 2002). 
Previous studies of the pre-World War I creditors and debtors focused 
mostly on the main determinants of the capital flows, such as the dependency 
ratio (Williamson and Taylor 1994), natural resources, migrants, and educated, 
young, urban populations (Clemens and Williamson 2004), the colonial status 
that significantly reduced the default risk perceived by investors (Ferguson and 
Schularick 2006), or institutional quality (Schularick and Steger 2008). 
This paper takes a different approach and examines the main determinants 
of the current account directly, drawing on the previous empirical works 
(Chinn and Prasad 2003, Ito and Chinn 2007, Chinn and Ito 2007a, and Debelle 
and Faruqee 1996). The main aim of the paper is to test the twin deficits and 
the global savings glut hypothesis. The empirical analysis relies upon the data-
set comprised of 14 countries for the period of 1865 through 1913 and 107 
countries (21 developed and 86 developing) for the period of 1970 through 
2007.  
To anticipate the findings, I find the following. The results suggest that the 
twin deficits hypothesis and the global savings glut hypothesis are not mutually 
exclusive. The former holds better for developing countries. In the pre-War 
period, the government budget balance is significant only in the short-run, 
suggesting the importance of the short-run fluctuations in the current account 
balance (see Veselkova 2010). The global savings glut hypothesis holds for the 
post-Bretton-Woods period. Countries with more developed financial markets 
tend to run current account deficits (or lower current account surpluses). How-
ever, the significance of the capital openness was not confirmed. Similar con-
clusions hold for the pre-War period. There, however, the testing of the hy-
pothesis is limited by the data availability. Finally, the higher the initial level of 
the net foreign assets, the higher the current account balance. This was true 
especially in the pre-World-War I period.  
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2. Historical Overview 
In this section, I discuss the evolution of the global imbalances in two eras of 
globalization. The emphasis is on the effect of global imbalances on policies, as 
well as the surrounding academic debates. I define global imbalances as the 
situation when substantial and persistent current account surplus in one country 
(or a set of countries) is matched by substantial and persistent current account 
deficit in another country (or a set of countries). The current account balance is 
defined as the difference between savings and investment. 
In the pre-1914 era, key creditor nations, principally Britain, France and 
Germany, developed enormous one-way positions in their portfolios. Britain, 
the largest capital exporter, invested abroad 5 percent of GDP between 1873 
and 1913, reaching peak of 10 percent just before the outbreak of war (Fishlow 
1985, 384). The capital exports of France averaged roughly half of British 
levels, both on average and for the final surge in 1910-13 (ibid). Germany, 
which was a latecomer, exported 2 percent of GDP (ibid). Overall, in 1914, 
these three countries accounted for almost three quarters of the world total 
foreign investment (Esteves 2008, 31, table 1). As indicated by the title of 
Feis’s (1930) book, Europe was a true banker of the world.  
The capital exports were directed to various world regions. Great Britain in-
vested mostly in the New World and within the Empire. The largest capital 
importer was the United States. However, foreign lending accounted for no 
more than 10 to 15 percent of the U.S. investment during the peak years (Fish-
low 1985, 384). In contrast, France and Germany exported the capital mostly to 
their colonies and Europe, with Russia being the largest debtor. The majority of 
these capital flows were directed to relatively rich countries (Clemens and 
Williamson 2004; Schularick and Steger 2008; Esteves 2008), giving empirical 
support to the classical paradox of capital’s failure to flow from countries with 
relatively high capital/labor ratios to countries with relatively low ratios (Lucas 
1990).  
The high capital exports led to a policy response especially in Great Britain. 
The last third of the nineteenth century was marked by economic and political 
rivalries among the Great Britain, continental powers France and Germany and 
the United States. Facing relative decline in world markets and diplomacy, 
Britain’s capital investments became highly politicized. Although the general 
course of the laissez-faire attitude to the foreign investment did not change, 
there were several episodes, which point out to the execution of the political 
influence over the course of the movement of the British capital.1 The most 
apparent interventions in the capital movement were those of Joseph Chamber-
lain through his position of the Colonial Secretary. Within weeks of taking 
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office in 1895 Chamberlain publicly pledged himself to a policy of develop-
ment in the crown colonies, many of which he regarded “as being in the condi-
tion of underdeveloped estates” to be developed “by the judicious investment 
of British money” (Will, 1970, 131). The development support focused mostly 
on Africa and West Indies.2 Government intervened only sporadically and 
mostly in instances where the foreign investment could be used as a tool of 
economic diplomacy (see Feis, 1974). That was the case of a sudden removal 
of the Governmental support from the Bagdad Railway scheme (Feis 1974, 
342-360; and Francis 1973); intervention in the Chinese loan (Edwards 1928) 
or the bail out of the Baring Brothers (Ferns 1960, Ferns 1992, Mitchener and 
Weidenmier, 2007).  
In addition to the above mentioned one-time interventions, a more systemic 
tool was used to affect the movement of British capital, namely the Colonial 
Stock Acts (especially 1900 revision). Their aim was to promote the economic 
development of the colonies and dominions by directing the capital towards the 
British dominions and colonies (Feis 1974, 92-95). However, it must be noted 
that although the volume of capital for Empire Colonial and Provincial obliga-
tions nearly doubled between 1900 and 1914, the proportion of British capital 
exports destined for the British Empire declined steadily after 1900 (Stone 
1999, 12).  
The large European current account surpluses were wiped out by the World 
War I. Europe was forced to liquidate major part of its huge assets abroad and 
borrow from abroad to finance its war efforts. On the other hand, the War mo-
bilized the U.S. economy and largely accelerated its transition from a net 
debtor to an important creditor nation. During the interwar period, the capital 
flows were affected by the problem of reparations and war debts and disrupted 
by the financial crashes of the 1930s and the beginning of the Great Depres-
sion. After the World War II, the United States emerged as the major world 
creditor.  
In the second era of globalization that started with the collapse of the Bret-
ton Woods international monetary system in 1971, most of the capital flew 
among the rich countries. There were only two episodes of significant capital 
flows to developing countries: Latin America at the end of the 1980s and East 
Asia and Latin America in the 1990s. Both episodes were disrupted by the 
financial crisis. However, Lucas paradox became even more puzzling in the 
first decade of the third millennium: the capital started to flow from the labor-
abundant China (and East Asia) to the capital rich United States. But whereas 
the current account surpluses accumulated by the developing countries and 
their capital flows to the centre of the international economy were new, the 
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current account deficit of the world’s largest economy has been a decades old 
story. 
The United States, once the world’s largest creditor, became a net debtor in 
1982, when its current account balance slipped into deficit of 3.39% of GDP 
and has remained there ever since, with a single exception of 1991. Further 
breaking point came in 1986, when the U.S. net international investment posi-
tion, a difference between U.S.-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned assets 
in the United States, turned negative and reached the value of -21.8 billion 
USD (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis). The United States was thus the net 
debtor in both the flow and stock terms.  
The country that replaced the United States in its traditional role of the 
world’s largest creditor was Japan, which rose to an economic power by the 
1970s. The Japanese current account balance has been in surplus since 1981 
and it continued to rise rapidly, reaching a peak of more than 4 percent of GDP 
in 1986, or 85.9 USD billion in absolute terms (International Financial Statis-
tics, IMF). In the same year, Japan became the world’s largest creditor. Japa-
nese foreign assets totaled $437.7 billion, while liabilities amounted to $307.9 
billion, leaving Japan with net assets of $129.8 billion (New York Times, 
28/May/1986). 
How to deal with the imbalance was a matter of heated debate among scien-
tists as well as in Washington. Some associated the deteriorating trade balance 
with the appreciating dollar. Krugman (1985) and Cooper (1985) argued that 
the foreign exchange market had been driven by an irrational “speculative 
bubble”, which pushed dollar above “fundamental” levels, and this way in-
duced the trade deficit. As a result of the fast dollar appreciation, the price 
competitiveness of U.S. products relative to the rest of the world decreased. 
The policy recommendation was to talk the dollar down or intervene in the 
foreign exchange market, possibly in combination with a fiscal contraction. 
This strategy was partly employed in 1985 Plaza Accord, by which govern-
ments of the major trading nations agreed to depreciate the U.S. dollar in rela-
tion to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark by intervening in the 
currency markets. Despite the success of the interventions, the U.S. trade defi-
cit did not significantly decrease. 
The need for the fiscal contraction was emphasized by the European coun-
tries and Japan, which were concerned about the ballooning U.S. budget defi-
cit, as the Reagan administration cut income tax, indexed tax brackets for infla-
tion and increased the defense spending. The call for fiscal contraction found 
its support in the twin deficit argument, which points out to the correlation 
between the fiscal and the trade deficit (Sachs and Roubini 1987, Ueda 1988, 
Ito 2009). The two are linked through the changes in interest rates. The U.S. 
fiscal expansion and the Japanese fiscal contraction raised U.S. interest rates 
relative to Japanese rates, induced a capital inflow from Japan to the United 
States, caused the dollar appreciation and worsened the U.S. trade balance.  
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In contrast to the theories presented above stands the position that the U.S. 
trade deficit was a result of U.S. economic strength. “It is a mystery to me 
why,” writes Milton Friedman (1988),  
it is regarded as a sign of Japanese strength and American weakness that the 
Japanese find it more attractive to invest in the U.S. than Japan. Surely it is 
precisely the reverse – a sign of U.S. strength and Japanese weakness. 
According to this view, the international capital flew to the economy with the 
best investment opportunities. Therefore, the policy recommendation was to do 
nothing. 
This laissez-faire attitude prevailed during the first Reagan administration, 
1981-1984.3 The main opposition to the non-interventionist attitude of the 
White House and the Treasury came from the Congress. The growth of the 
imports to the United States was matched by the growth of the protectionist 
rhetoric and led to the trade and investment frictions between the United States 
and Japan. The shift in the government policy came when the trade deficit was 
heading to a new record in 1985, nearly four times what it was in 1981. In 
order to reduce the deficit and deal with the protectionist pressure in the Con-
gress, the administration moved towards activism on exchange rates and pres-
sures on opening of foreign markets to U.S. exports.  
Easing of the protectionist pressures came only with a temporary reduction 
in the U.S. current account deficit due to the brief 1990-1991 recession. In 
1991, the current account balance achieved a single positive value since 1982. 
However, the modest surplus of 1991 was mostly caused by large unilateral 
transfers from the U.S. allies in the Gulf War. Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. 
current account deficit began to balloon again. What changed was the source of 
its financing. 
The key counterparts of the U.S. current account deficit were current ac-
count surpluses accumulated by China, oil-exporters and emerging Asia. In 
East Asia, the current account surpluses were motivated by the traumatizing 
experience of the East Asian crisis and were meant to buffer the impacts of the 
future potential crises. Compared to South East Asia, China was unaffected by 
the crisis. The willingness of China to finance the U.S. current account deficit 
stems from its commitment to the export-led growth and the solution to the 
trilemma subordinated to this development model. China opted for the stability 
of the fixed exchange rates and capital controls to prevent capital flows from 
undermining the peg. The independent monetary policy was sacrificed. Such a 
solution to the trilemma resembles the post-World War II monetary system and 
was therefore dubbed as “Bretton Woods II” by some (see Dooley et al. 2003). 
Finally, the source of the recent current account surpluses of the oil-exporting 
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countries lied elsewhere. Following the high increase in the price of oil, these 
countries started to accumulate petrodollars in exchange for their oil exports. 
Similarly to the Japanese-American trade debate, the protectionist opposi-
tion came from Congress.4 China was accused of manipulating its currency to 
maintain the price competitiveness of its exports. Between September 2003 and 
2008, some three dozen new congressional bills with various sponsors were 
floated to challenge alleged Chinese unfair commercial practices, and bills 
introduced since January 2005 focused increasingly on the currency value 
(Hufbauer and Brunel 2008). A similar rhetoric was partially adopted by the 
White House. Treasury Secretaries John Snow and Henry Paulson tried to 
persuade China that exchange rate flexibility is in its own interest, as well as in 
the interest of the global economy and the United States.  
However, Chinese authorities have had a different stance on the issue. They 
have rejected the accusation that Chinese exchange-rate policy has given China 
an unfair advantage, as well as the idea that an appreciation of renminbi would 
resolve the global imbalances. They point out to the problems of the U.S. econ-
omy – low savings rate, and suggest cuts in both the consumer and government 
spending. Thus, similarly to Japan in the 1980s, China argues in line with the 
twin deficits argument. 
In contrast stands the global savings glut hypothesis (Bernanke 2005, Cabal-
lero et al. 2006, Ferguson 2009), according to which the excess of savings in 
developing countries combined with their underdeveloped financial markets 
directs these excess savings to the United States, whose deep and liquid finan-
cial markets are able to absorb it. Thus, similarly to the United States in the 
1980s, the policy recommendation is to do nothing on the U.S. part. Instead, 
China and other developing countries are advised to liberalize their capital 
account and adopt policies that would enhance the development of their finan-
cial markets.  
Although the presence of the global imbalances in both eras of globalization 
allows to draw interesting conclusions from the comparison, one should be 
cautious about the differences between two periods. First and foremost, 
whereas the world’s largest economy and the major military power was the 
world’s largest creditor in the prewar period, it has been the world’s largest 
debtor in the second era of globalization. Thus, whereas in the prewar period 
the excess savings were accumulated in the world’s richest countries, mostly as 
a side-effect of the industrial revolution, and redistributed to the developing 
part of the world, the situation has been more complex in the second era of 
globalization. There the current account surpluses were occasionally run by oil-
exporting countries, part of the rich European countries and in the past decade 
by China and East Asian countries. The savings of these countries were driven 
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by different factors. Whereas German economy is heavily export-oriented and 
oil-exporters benefit from the influx of petrodollars, Chinese household savings 
has risen due to the Open Door economic reforms and the growth prospects 
they generated, as well as the introduction of the one-child policy at around the 
same time, which led to a gradual increase in the ratio of employed to total 
population (Modigliani and Cao 2004, Kraay, 2000). A complementary expla-
nation is related to the precautionary motives (Chamon and Prasad 2008, Ber-
nanke 2006). The lack of social safety nets in China and the rising private 
burden of expenditures on housing, education, and health care lead to precau-
tionary savings, even in the poor rural areas. For example, only about 14 per-
cent of the population is covered by health insurance, and pension plans 
(which, in any case, replace only about 20 percent of pre-retirement earnings) 
apply to only about 16 percent of the economically active population (Ber-
nanke, 2006). In contrast to the prewar period, this savings was redistributed to 
the core country of the international economy. In 2005, United States absorbed 
at least 80% of the savings that the rest of the world did not invest at home 
(Roubini and Setser 2005, 2). 
Second, there are significant structural differences between two eras of 
globalization. Although both periods witnessed increasing capital mobility and 
financial integration (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004), the solution to the trilemma in 
the two periods was different. The classical gold standard of the prewar period 
rested on the fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility at the cost of inde-
pendent monetary policy. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods interna-
tional monetary system, most of the developed countries gradually moved 
towards flexible exchange rates, whereas a significant part of the developed 
world continued to peg their currencies. Finally, the prewar period was charac-
terized by significant flows of migrants from the Old World to vast empty 
territories of the New World. These are absent in the current era and impossible 
to replicate.  
Given these differences, we may ask whether forces determining the savings 
and investment balances, and thus the current account balances, were the same 
in two eras of globalization. In the next sections, I first discuss this question 
from the theoretical perspective and then examine it using panel data analysis. 
3. Theoretical Issues 
There are two major competing explanations of the global imbalances: the twin 
deficits hypothesis and the global savings glut hypothesis. The former draws 
the link between the current account balance and the budget balance, the latter 
between the current account on the one hand and the financial development and 
the capital openness on the other.  
 329
Financial Development 
The effect of the financial deepening on the current account balance is ambigu-
ous. Edwards (1995) suggests that the financial deepening could induce more 
saving. On the other hand, he notes that if the financial deepening is understood 
as a relaxed borrowing constraint, it may have the opposite effect and lead to 
the reduction in savings. The latter is emphasized by the proponents of the 
global savings glut hypothesis. 
The global savings glut hypothesis predicts the negative relationship be-
tween the financial development and savings: less financially developed mar-
kets offer little investment opportunities and therefore lead to higher savings 
rate. The accumulated savings are then transferred to the countries with more 
developed financial markets (Bernanke 2005). The ability of countries to gen-
erate financial assets from real investments was emphasized by Caballero et al. 
(2006). Their formal model illustrates that in the world comprised of (1) coun-
tries with deep financial markets and good growth conditions, (2) countries 
with deep financial markets but temporarily bad growth conditions and (3) 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets but exceptional growth condi-
tions, the capital will flow to the first and generate the current account deficit.  
The imperfect substitutability of financial instruments was stressed for both 
periods of globalization. Temin (1987, 453; 1989) argues that in the pre-War 
period the British investors faced a choice between liquid foreign bonds and 
illiquid equities of domestic firms. Similarly, Blanchard et al. (2005) argue that 
there is imperfect substitutability not only between U.S. and foreign goods but 
also between U.S. and foreign assets. The U.S. current account deficit is thus a 
result from exogenous increase in U.S. demand for foreign goods and in for-
eign demand for U.S. assets.5 
The financial development proxies were based on M1 or M2 monetary ag-
gregates. For the period of 1865-1913, M2 as a share of GDP (M2GDP) is used 
as the proxy of the financial development. Although this proxy gives the pic-
ture of the monetization of the economy, it does not capture more specific 
aspects of the financial development, such as the stock and bond market devel-
opment. These played an important role in Great Britain: in 1850 an estimated 
56 percent of financial assets could be classified as domestic or foreign debt, 
whereas in 1913 this had reached 64 percent of the total (Michie 1999, 71).  
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) argue that M1 and M2 may be a poor 
proxy of financial development because they do not capture the ability of fi-
nancial intermediaries to channel funds from savers to borrowers. Rather, M1 
and M2 are more related to the ability of financial systems to provide transac-
tion services. Therefore, in line with King and Levine (1993), I proxy the fi-
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nancial development as M3 as % of GDP (the liquid liabilities) for the period 
of 1970-2007. This measure includes currency and deposits in the central bank 
(M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and 
savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, 
and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign cur-
rency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market 
funds held by residents.6 
The second proxy of the financial development is the ratio of domestic 
credit (CREDIT) to the private sector to GDP (see De Gregorio and Guidotti 
1995, King and Levine 1993, Ito and Chinn 2007). The major advantage over 
the monetization ratio is that it excludes credit to the public sector and there-
fore captures the role of financial intermediaries in channeling funds to the 
private sector. Thus, an increase in the credit to the private sector may be un-
derstood as a relaxed borrowing constraint.  
The problem of this proxy is that it captures only the financial development 
that occurs through the banking system and does not capture the financial de-
velopment that occurs in the non-bank system, e.g. in stock markets. Therefore, 
the third proxy of the financial development is the stock market capitalization 
as a percentage of GDP (STOCK). To capture the effect of the overall size of 
the financial market, I use SIZE, the sum of private credit creation and stock 
market capitalization, both measured as a ratio to GDP (Chinn and Ito, 2007, 
7). 
As the size of the financial market may be less relevant if there is little mar-
ket activity (Beck et al. 2001), I control also for the activeness of the market. 
Following Ito and Chinn (2007), I use the stock market total value (SMTV) 
traded as a ratio to GDP and stock market turnover (SMTO) as a ratio to GDP 
as proxies of the financial market activity. Second, to capture the efficiency of 
the financial market, I rely on two banking sector indicators: the net interest 
margin (MARGIN) and bank’s overhead costs as a share of their total assets 
(OVERHEAD). Finally, I control also for the effect of the public bond market 
capitalization (PBBM). M3/GDP data comes from WDI. The rest of the data 
for the period of 1970 through 2007 comes from the December 2009 update of 
Beck et al. (2000) database. The historical data for the pre-War period come 
from Butlin (1961), Bordo et al. (2001), Capie and Webber (2005), de Mattia 
(1967), Gregory (2004), Grytten (2004), Klovland (2004), Mitchell (2008), 
Tilly (1973), U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), and Urquhart (1963).  
                                                             
6  It must be noted that if measured as the monetization, the U.S. financial development is 
above average but not exceptional: the average U.S. M3GDP between 1970 and 2007 is 
0.71. This value is close to the mean plus 1 s.d. value of 0.84. Similarly, British monetiza-
tion ratio is relatively smaller compared, e.g. to Scandinavian or German, probably reflect-
ing the dominance of the stock market over the banking financial development.  
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Capital Openness 
In the global imbalances debate, Bernanke (2005) suggests that the openness of 
the financial markets can affect the direction of cross-border capital flows. For 
example, the capital account liberalization in East Asian economies allowed the 
excessive savings flow to the United States and other countries with developed 
financial markets. It is of interest to examine also the interaction between the 
financial development and the capital openness. The proxy of the capital open-
ness is KAOPEN index (Chinn-Ito 2007b). 
The variable is not included in the analysis of the pre-war current account. 
The main reason is the data availability.7 However, I do not expect that exclu-
sion of this variable would have a significant effect on the results because the 
classical gold standard era was associated with free capital mobility. Even in 
countries, where governments tried to control the way their citizens or banks 
invested their capital, the latter had the choice of channeling their funds 
through other financial centers, especially London (Esteves 2008, 1).  
Budget Balance 
In contrast to the global savings glut stands the twin deficits argument that 
points out to the positive correlation of the current account and the budget 
balance. The intertemporal models of the current account suggest that the gov-
ernment budget deficits induce current account deficits by redistributing in-
come from future to present generations (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1998). In case of 
absent Ricardian equivalence (Barro 1974), i.e. the budget deficit coupled by 
an increase in the private savings as the taxpayers save for the future tax rise; 
the budget deficit might result in the decrease in national savings (or a Keynes-
ian increase in aggregate demand).8 The expected sign of the government 
budget estimate is therefore positive. The fiscal balance is measured as gov-
ernment budget balance as a share of GDP.  
                                                             
7  A possible solution would be to replace KAOPEN index by the net foreign capital flows as 
a share of GDP. However, there is a theoretical difficulty in equaling capital inflows with 
capital openness. An economy with a high degree of capital openness may still attract only 
small capital inflows, if other factors, such as institutional quality or educated labor force 
are missing. Second, the most widely used data on British capital exports gathered by Stone 
(1999) would pose two problems. First, based on the studies by Clemens and Williamson 
(2004), Esteves (2008) or Schularick and Steger (2008), it is reasonable to expect a high 
correlation between the capital inflows and the GDP per capita. This would plague the re-
gression with multicollinearity. Second, these data do not cover French and German capital 
flows, which played an important role in Europe. For example, Russia, the largest European 
debtor, enjoyed large capital inflows from France thanks to the Franco-Russian Alliance. 
Thus, Stone’s data would underestimate the capital inflows to European regions. 
8  For the review of the literature on the Ricardian effects, see Bernheim (1987) and Briotti 
(2005).  
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For the period of 1970-2007, the budget balance (GOVBAL) was measured 
as the cash surplus/deficit as a percentage of GDP. The data come from World 
Development Indicators database. For the pre-War period, the budget balance 
was measured as the difference between the government revenue and the gov-
ernment expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The data come from Mitchell 
(2008), Bordo et al. (2001), and Obstfeld and Jones (1997).  
In addition to the twin deficits and the global savings glut hypotheses, there 
is a large body of literature that points out to other determinants of the current 
account balance over the medium-run.  
Dependency Ratio 
Widely discussed are demographic factors, especially the one child policy of 
China. According to the life cycle theory, a higher share of economically de-
pendent persons in the population reduces national savings, and hence the 
current account balance (see Mason 1988). However, the demographic profiles 
matter only in case when they differ across countries. Williamson and Taylor 
(1994) argue that in the pre-War period high dependency rates in three New 
World countries (Argentina, Australia and Canada) depressed domestic savings 
rates and pulled in foreign investment. Therefore, it is appropriate to view the 
large capital inflows as an intergenerational transfer from old savers in the Old 
World to young savers in the New World. Typically, a one-percentage-point 
rise in the dependency rate led approximately to a one-percentage-point fall in 
the aggregate savings rate. However, this did not hold for the fourth country in 
their sample, the United States. The reason could be that Great Britain and the 
United States had roughly similar youth dependency ratios from 1880 to 1910. 
Green and Urquhart (1976, 228, fn) note that the emigration of those in the 20-
40 age group increased the youth dependency in the UK, whereas the immigra-
tion of the same age group to the United States decreased the youth depend-
ency despite higher U.S. natural increase rates. 
The story of dependency ratios of the past decade is well-known. Chinese 
policy of one child decreased the dependency rates. Furthermore, preference of 
sons over daughters leads to a distortion in the natural male-female rates in the 
population. In China alone, the imbalance between the sexes was 108 boys to 
100 girls for the generation born in the late 1980s and escalated to 124 to 100 
for the generation of the early 2000s (Economist, 4 March 2010). Distorted sex 
ratios can be found also in other East Asian countries or western Balkans and 
the Caucasus. Wei and Shang (2009) suggest that this imbalance further raises 
savings in China via the bequest motives, as families with sons save to make 
their son competitive in the marriage market.  
Modigliani (1970) also suggests that in a life-cycle setting, higher income 
growth will lead to higher private savings as a result of aggregation across 
households. However, Carroll and Summers (1991) argue that the relationship 
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between the economic growth and savings is ambiguous and should be nega-
tive in the short run. To capture the differences in the demographic profiles of 
countries, I use total (DEPR), old (OLDEP) and youth dependency ratio 
(YTHDEP) as a percentage of GDP, where the age dependency ratio is defined 
as the share of young and old age population (below 15 and above 65) to work-
ing age population (between 15 and 64). The data come from WDI database. 
For the pre-war period, I use the youth dependency ratio measured as the pro-
portion of the children aged 14 or below as a fraction of the total population. 
The data comes from Clemens and Williamson (2004).  
Economic Growth 
Economic growth is another factor often cited as the current account determi-
nant. The stage of economic development hypothesis suggests that a country 
moving from a low to an intermediate stage of development requires higher 
investment (see Kindleberger 1993 or Lassudrie-Duchêne et al. 1990). There-
fore, it imports capital and runs the current account deficit. As the country 
matures, its current account balance improves and it is able to repay its external 
liabilities. Lassudrie-Duchêne et al (1990) point out that as the competition 
from the developing countries rises, the profitability of mature economies falls. 
They lower their savings and increase their consumption, which results in the 
trade balance deficit.  
Two proxies are used to capture the stage of economic development hy-
pothesis. First, the real per capita income (relative to the average real per capita 
income of Great Britain, France and Germany in the pre-War period (RELY-
INCOME) or relative to the average real per capita income of the high-income 
OECD countries in the post-BW period (RELYOECD)) is expected to have a 
positive relationship with the current account, as the countries at the lower 
stage of economic development are assumed to run current account deficits. 
However, if taking into account Lassudrie-Duchêne et al. (1990), the expecta-
tions about the sign are ambiguous. Second, real economic growth (ECON-
GROWTH) is expected to have the negative relationship with the current ac-
count, as the less developed countries tend to grow faster than the developed 
countries and are borrowing against their future income. For the period of 
1970-2007, the data come from the WDI database. For the pre-War period, the 
data come from Clemens and Williamson (2004). 
Net Foreign Assets 
As the current account is the sum of the trade balance and the return on a coun-
try’s stock of net foreign assets (NFA), the stock of NFA serves as an initial 
condition. There are two hypothetical relationships between the NFA and the 
CA. Countries with a higher initial NFA can sustain a higher trade deficit while 
remaining solvent. Here, the relationship between the NFA and the CA is nega-
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tive. The positive relationship exists for countries with higher NFA that enjoy 
higher foreign income flows. This was the case of the prewar Great Britain. Its 
net income from shipping, insurance, interest and dividends were more than 
sufficient to produce a substantial current account surplus, despite running a 
deficit on merchandise trade (Eichengreen 2005, 14). The NFA is measured as 
net foreign assets in the initial year of the five-year average. The data come 
from an updated version of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). For the pre-War 
period, the data come from Goldsmith (1985). Here, the sample is drawn down 
to six countries due to data availability.  
Institutional Quality 
Institutional quality affects the incentives to save and invest, as it defines how 
well the returns from these activities are protected. For example, the high risk 
of expropriation has a negative impact on the incentive to invest.9 Decisions by 
foreign residents are affected too. Alfaro et al. (2005) document that the institu-
tional quality is the major factor that attracted the capital flows during 1970-
2000. Similar conclusion was made by Schularick and Steger (2008) for the 
prewar period.  
Chinn and Ito (2005) find that in the developed countries, the effect of the 
financial development on savings is conditional on the legal system and open 
financial markets: countries with highly developed legal system and open fi-
nancial countries undertake less savings. For less developed countries and 
emerging market countries they find the reverse correlation: greater financial 
development leads to higher savings.  
Three proxies are used to capture institutional quality. The primary proxy is 
POLITY2 score of the POLITY IV Project.10 The score reflects various aspects 
of the institutional quality, such as existing constraints on the exercise of power 
by the executive, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment and 
competitiveness and regulation of political participation. The range is (-10, 10). 
The higher the score, the higher the institutional quality. The second proxy is 
XCONST score of the POLITY IV Project, i.e. the existing constraints on the 
executive. The score is included in the POLITY2 variable but it is of interest to 
test for its effect separately, as it can be understood as a proxy of the risk of 
expropriation. Finally, bond spread (SPREAD) is assumed to capture the cred-
itworthiness of the country in the prewar period.  
                                                             
9  Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) document that British investors had access to information 
about political and economic situation. 
10  For a more detailed information, see Marshall and Jaggers (2009).  
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Trade Openness 
The importance of trade openness was emphasized by some of the U.S. politi-
cians since the 1980s, who suggested the link between low trade barriers and 
the U.S. current account deficit. Trade openness could be correlated with the 
factors that make the country attractive to foreign investment. It may also sig-
nal a better ability to service external debt. This was particularly important in 
the prewar period. I measure the trade openness as the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP (TRADEGDP).  
Terms of Trade Volatility 
Higher terms of trade of volatility might induce precautionary savings as con-
sumers try to smooth their consumption in the face of more volatile income 
flows. I measure the terms of trade volatility as the standard deviation of the 
terms of trade over the corresponding five-year period (TOTSD). For the pre-
War period, the data come from Williamson (2008). For the period of 1970-
2008, the data come from WDI database.  
Oil 
Finally, Sachs (1981) suggests that if the oil shock is expected to have a transi-
tory effect on income, it will lead to the reduction in the current account bal-
ance. From this perspective, being an oil exporter may lead to an increase in the 
current account balance in episodes of oil price shocks. In order to control for 
the effect of oil, I include the OIL dummy, which takes the value of 1 for oil-
exporting countries and 0 otherwise.  
4. The Medium-Term Determinants of 
the Current Account Balance, 1865-1913 
This part examines the medium-term determinants of the current account bal-
ance in the pre-World War I period. The data set is comprised of yearly data for 
14 countries and covers the period of 1865-1913. The countries included in the 
sample are: Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Denmark 
(DEN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Norway 
(NOR), Russia (RUS), Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE), United Kingdom (UK), 
and the United States (USA). The number of countries in the sample was con-
strained by the data availability. Nevertheless, in 1913 the countries included in 
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the sample produced almost 62 percent of the world GDP (Maddison, 2001).11 
The complete list of variables and the data sources is available upon request.  
To capture the medium-term effects, 5-year non-overlapping averages are 
used.12 For the last period 1910-1913, a 4-year average is used. In order to 
check the robustness of the results and to capture the long-term and short-term 
determinants of the current account, cross-section averages, as well as yearly 
data are used (see section on the robustness of the results).  
The current account deficit ranged from -30 percent of GDP to 8.6 percent 
of GDP. The highest current account deficit was reached by Argentina in the 
years running up to the Baring Crisis of 1890. In 1989, the Argentinean current 
account deficit reached the value of more than 30 percent of GDP. The maxi-
mum current account surplus of 8.6 percent of GDP was reached by Great 
Britain in 1913.  
Most of the correlations of explanatory variables are below 0.50. The corre-
lation of POLITY2 and relative income per capita is slightly over 50%. This is 
in line with the seminal work of Acemoglu et al. (2001) who document the 
positive relationship between the economic growth and the quality of institu-
tions. A more troublesome is the correlation between M2GDP and 
TRADEGDP, which is more than 70 percent. Furthermore, regressions with 
interaction terms are often plagued with multicollinearity problem. Therefore, I 
calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for multicollinearity. As a rule of 
thumb, VIF higher than 10 indicates serious multicollinearity problem. The 
largest VIF (POLITY2) is 10.899 and the mean VIF is 3.493. To check the 
robustness of the results, I reestimated the current account regressions without 
interaction terms. This decreased the largest VIF to 2.446 (TRADEGDP) and 
the mean VIF equaled 1.701. There was no significant change in the magnitude 
or the size of the coefficients in FE or PCSE model (see below). However, the 
effect of institutional quality in the FE model was no longer significant (the p-
value was 14.6%, available upon request).13 
4.1 General Model 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to identify the main determinants of cur-
rent account deficit during the period of 1865-1913. The empirical approach 
follows the previous empirical studies of Debelle and Faruqee (1996), Calderon 
                                                             
11  Note that the proportion may be overestimated, as the data for Russia include all the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union.  
12  It is important to note that the 5-year averages panel consists of 14 countries and 10 time 
periods. The panels with n>T are called short panels. Such panels pose different require-
ments on certain aspects of the estimation. These issues are discussed in more detail below. 
13  Traditionally, the mean-centering is used to solve the multicollinearity problem. However, 
the recent research suggests that mean-centering does not alleviate collinearity problems 
(see Echambadi and Hess 2007). 
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et al. (2002), Chinn and Prasad (2003), Ito and Chinn (2007), Chinn and Ito 
(2007a) and Lee (2008). To test the various explanations of the current account 
behavior, I estimate the model proposed by Ito and Chinn (2007, 10), which 
may be expressed in the following form: 
 
yi,t = αi + β1FDi,t + β1IQi,t + β2KAOPENi,t + β3(FDi,t * IQ i,t) + β4 (FDi,t * KAO-
PENi,t) + β5 (IQi,t * KAOPENi,t) + λXit + νi,t  
 
where the dependent variable is the current account balance expressed as a 
percentage of GDP (negative values indicate a deficit) for the i-th unit at time t. 
As the current account equals the difference between the saving and invest-
ment, the model is estimated also with savings and investment (as a percentage 
of GDP) as the dependent variables. The independent variables include the 
financial development (FD), institutional quality (IQ) and the capital openness 
(KAOPEN). Xi,t is the vector of control variables (real economic growth, real 
per capita income relative to the real per capita income of the average income 
of the UK, France and Germany, government budget balance, youth depend-
ency ratio, trade openness, the terms of trade volatility and the initial net for-
eign assets). The vector β and λ is a vector of coefficients and νi,t is the compos-
ite error. 
To estimate the model, several techniques are considered. First, pooled ordi-
nary least squares (OLS), fixed effects and random effects are estimated.14 
Each of the specifications is based on certain assumptions. The most common 
assumption made is the one of parameter homogeneity, i.e. we assume that αit 
= α and βit = β for all i, t. In other words, we assume that there is neither sig-
nificant country nor significant temporal effect. However, it is more reasonable 
to assume that heterogeneity is the main characteristic of the countries under 
consideration. To model heterogeneity, one assumes that the composite error νi,t 
– in case of the twoway model – consists of three components: (1) the country-
specific and time-invariant error term ui, sometimes referred to as the unob-
served effect, (2) the specific time effect and (3) an idiosyncratic error εit that 
captures the residual errors.  
There are two assumptions made about the individual and/or time effects 
and the independent variables. The random effects assumption is that the unob-
served effect is not correlated with the independent variables. The fixed effects 
assumption is that the unobserved effect is correlated with the independent 
variables. If the random effects assumption holds, the random effects model is 
preferred to the fixed effects model because the random effects estimator is 
more efficient than the fixed effects estimator. However, if there is correlation 
between the individual and/or time effects and the independent variables, then 
                                                             
14  For an overview of the econometric analysis of the panel data, see Wooldridge (2002), 
chapters 13-14.  
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the individual and time effects must be estimated as dummy variables in order 
to solve the endogeneity problem. Therefore, the fixed effects model is some-
times called the least squares dummy variable model. 
To put these considerations into practice, at first the simple pooled OLS 
model is estimated. This model serves as the benchmark model. Then the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests of country or/time effects based on 
the results of the pooling model are implemented (Breusch and Pagan 1980). 
The test results suggest significant country and/or time effects (not reported 
here). 
Therefore, the panel techniques are preferred to the simple pooled OLS 
model, i.e. the fixed effects and random effects models are estimated. Next, 
Hausman test is used to test whether the random effects assumption of no cor-
relation between the individual and/or time effects and the independent vari-
ables holds (not reported here). The results of the test indicate that the random 
effects assumption does not hold and so the fixed effects model provides a 
better specification. Finally, the F test is used to test whether the country, tem-
poral or twoway effects are redundant (not reported here). The results suggest 
the use of fixed effects model with country effects. 
Based on the above, the model of interest is the fixed effects model with 
country effects. Here, a note must be made about the autocorrelation in the 
model. The Durbin-Watson statistic formed by computing the first-order resid-
ual correlation on the stacked set of residuals suggests the presence of autocor-
relation in the model. The presence of autocorrelation was further tested (not 
reported here). The results suggest the presence of serial correlation in idiosyn-
cratic errors. This is supported especially by Wooldridge’s test for the serial 
correlation in errors (see Wooldridge 2002, 10.6.3). An advantage of this test is 
that it does not rely on large T asymptotics and has good properties in “short” 
panels. It is also robust to general heteroskedasticity. 
I deal with the autocorrelation problem in two ways. First, I adopt Arellano 
(1987) approach of computing White coefficient covariance estimates that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and rely on large n asymptot-
ics with small T, as is the case of the panel data used in this study. 
Second, I adopt panel-corrected standard error estimator (PCSE) developed 
by Beck and Katz (1995), who suggest weighting the observations for AR(1) 
serial correlations and then adjusting the standard errors for cross-sectional 
correlation. The standard errors computed this way are robust to more general 
serial correlation. In regard to this study, the main advantage of the PCSE 
estimator is that it estimates the Parks model even when n>T. 
Estimation results are reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The models of interest 
are FE model and PCSE model. As the current account is the difference be-
tween savings and investment, I re-estimate the basic model also with savings 
and investment as dependent variables. The relative income and growth rate are 
significant in both models. Contrary to the predictions of the stage of economic 
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development hypothesis, the coefficient of the relative income is negative. A 1 
percentage point increase in relative income leads to a 0.115 to 0.128 percent-
age point decrease in the current account balance.  
Similarly, the sign of the GDP growth indicates that faster growing coun-
tries tended to run current account surpluses. This is against the theoretical 
expectations that domestic economic growth accelerates demand for foreign 
goods and services and the current account balance deteriorates (see Abel and 
Bernanke 2001). A 1 percentage point increase in economic growth leads to a 
0.413 to 0.559 percentage point increase in the current account balance.  
Table 1: Current Account Regressions, 1865-1913 
Model FE country PCSE  FE country FE country PCSE 
C 23.135 (7.724, 0.004) 
14.362 
(13.231, 0.283)
-9.046 
(11.780, 0.449) 
9.444 
(11.419, 0.415) 
RELYINCOME -0.115 (0.054, 0.036) 
-0.128 
(0.056, 0.025) 
-0.083 
(0.104, 0.430) 
0.010 
(0.033, 0.761) 
ECONGROWTH 0.559 (0.149, 0.000) 
0.413 
(0.161, 0.013) 
0.041 
(0.188, 0.828) 
0.267 
(0.294, 0.372) 
YTHDEP -0.434 (0.150, 0.005) 
-0.103 
(0.332, 0.759) 
0.140 
(0.207, 0.504) 
-0.182 
(0.333, 0.589) 
GOVBAL 0.073 (0.207, 0.725) 
0.098 
(0.152, 0.523) 
-0.007 
(0.161, 0.964) 
-0.110 
(0.148, 0.465) 
TRADEGDP -0.071 (0.113, 0.529) 
0.100 
(0.114, 0.386) 
0.337 
(0.139, 0.022) 
0.974 
(0.076, 0.211) 
M2GDP 0.033 (0.033, 0.323) 
-0.101 
(0.052, 0.056) 
0.034 
(0.029, 0.250) 
-0.144 
(0.062, 0.029) 
POLITY2 -0.384 (0.216, 0.079) 
-0.385 
(0.346, 0.271) 
-0.596 
(0.146, 0.000) 
-0.229 
(0.432, 0.600) 
M2GDP*POLITY2 0.003 (0.004, 0.458) 
0.007 
(0.005, 0.215) 
0.006 
(0.004, 0.201) 
0.003 
(0.006, 0.613) 
TOTSD -0.035 (0.044, 0.432) 
-0.016 
(0.044, 0.720) 
0.027 
(0.022, 0.240) 
0.004 
(0.059, 0.944) 
NFAin   0.088 (0.019, 0.000) 
0.021 
(0.017, 0.230) 
AR(1)  0.505 (0.175, 0.006)  
0.490 
(0.186, 0.014) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.743 0.772 0.657 0.621 
Countries 14 14 6 6 
Observations 92 78 45 39 
Time span 1865-1913 1870-1913 1865-1913 1870-1913 
Notes: White period standard errors and p-values in parentheses. 
Sample 14: Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), France 
(FRA), Germany (GER), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Norway (NOR), Russia (RUS), Spain 
(SPA), Sweden (SWE), United Kingdom (UK), United States (USA). 
Sample 6: Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States.  
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Table 2: Savings Regressions, 1865-1913 
Model FE twoways PCSE  FE country FE twoways PCSE FE country 
C -4.126 (11.625, 0.724) 
-1.666 
(14.177, 0.907)
-62.174 
(10.629, 0.000)
-34.465 
(21.211, 0.118) 
RELYINCOME 0.084 (0.059, 0.160) 
0.176 
(0.039, 0.000) 
0.160 
(0.119, 0.193) 
0.048 
(0.065, 0.471) 
ECONGROWTH 0.526 (0.235, 0.029) 
0.425 
(0.193, 0.032) 
-0.318 
(0.433, 0.471) 
-0.005 
(0.389, 0.990) 
YTHDEP 0.171 (0.364, 0.641) 
-0.049 
(0.338, 0.886) 
0.724 
(0.733, 0.335) 
0.489 
(0.545, 0.379) 
GOVBAL -0.045 (0.234, 0.849) 
0.270 
(0.375, 0.474) 
0.384 
(0.436, 0.389) 
-0.053 
(0.414, 0.899) 
TRADEGDP 0.276 (0.190, 0.152) 
0.364 
(0.125, 0.005) 
1.164 
(0.342, 0.003) 
0.724 
(0.182, 0.001) 
M2GDP -0.060 (0.057, 0.298) 
-0.132 
(0.062, 0.038) 
0.0365 
(0.103, 0.727) 
0.053 
(0.057, 0.365) 
POLITY2 0.131 (0.622, 0.834) 
-0.340 
(0.331, 0.309) 
0.267 
(1.066, 0.805) 
1.198 
(0.873, 0.184) 
M2GDP*POLITY2 -0.008 (0.009, 0.358) 
0.005 
(0.005, 0.350) 
-0.005 
(0.012, 0.672) 
-0.010 
(0.014, 0.509) 
TOTSD 0.006 (0.075, 0.937) 
-0.005 
(0.071, 0.941) 
0.079 
(0.054, 0.161) 
0.044 
(0.088, 0.626) 
NFAin   0.184 (0.617, 0.008) 
0.125 
(0.053, 0.027) 
AR(1)  0.625 (0.144, 0.000)  
-0.174 
(0.284, 0.546) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.760 0.798 0.705 0.649 
Countries 14 14 6 6 
Observations 92 78 45 39 
Time span 1865-1913 1870-1913 1865-1913 1870-1913 
Notes: see Table 1.  
 
Inspecting the results from the saving and investment regressions yields addi-
tional insights. The effect of the relative income and economic growth on the 
current account is less puzzling when looking at the savings and investment 
regressions. A 1 percentage-point increase in the economic growth leads to a  
-0.156 to 0.026 percentage point change in the investment but an effect of a 
higher economic growth on savings is much higher. A 1 percentage point in-
crease in economic growth leads to a 0.425 to 0.526 increase in savings.  
The effect of the youth dependency on the current account is in line with the 
theoretical predictions. A 1 percentage point increase in the youth dependency 
leads to a 0.434 percentage point decrease in the current account. Interestingly, 
the effect of youth dependency on savings is not significant. 
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Table 3: Investment Regressions, 1865-1913 
Model FE country PCSE FE country FE country PCSE 
C -22.942 (18.787, 0.226)
-22.352 
(14.820, 0.137) 
-30.536 
(15.389, 0.057)
-17.640 
(21.538, 0.422) 
RELYINCOME 0.237 (0.099, 0.019) 
0.290 
(0.067, 0.000) 
0.116  
(0.101, 0.266)
0.119 
(0.097, 0.232) 
ECONGROWTH -0.156 (0.157, 0.325) 
0.026 
(0.223, 0.909) 
0.074 
(0.158, 0.646)
-0.188 
(0.400, 0.643) 
YTHDEP 0.247 (0.330, 0.457) 
0.143 
(0.331, 0.667) 
0.550 
(0.376, 0.154)
0.190 
(0.599, 0.754) 
GOVBAL 0.144 (0.141, 0.313) 
0.103 
(0.276, 0.710) 
0.033 
(0.191, 0.864)
0.013 
(0.295, 0.966) 
TRADEGDP 0.371 (0.150, 0.016) 
0.353 
(0.136, 0.012) 
0.455 
(0.233, 0.060)
0.323 
(0.173, 0.074) 
M2GDP -0.004 (0.037, 0.921) 
-0.009 
(0.054, 0.867) 
0.013 
(0.066, 0.839)
0.022 
(0.055, 0.698) 
POLITY2 0.802 (0.461, 0.086) 
0.307 
(0.399, 0.445) 
0.771 
(0.494, 0.129)
2.297 
(0.853, 0.013) 
M2GDP*POLITY2 -0.013 (0.007, 0.068) 
-0.006 
(0.006, 0.341) 
-0.005 
(0.008, 0.524)
-0.022 
(0.013, 0.120) 
TOTSD 0.026 (0.043, 0.545) 
0.017 
(0.069, 0.805) 
0.050 
(0.051, 0.330)
-0.030 
(0.079, 0.712) 
NFAin   0.046 (0.043, 0.286)
0.023 
(0.040, 0.568) 
AR(1)  0.408 (0.184, 0.030)  
-0.076 
(0.234, 0.749) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.767 0.803 0.725 0.0772 
Countries 14 14 6 6 
Observations 93 79 45 39 
Time span 1865-1913 1870-1913 1865-1913 1870-1913 
Notes: see Table 1.  
 
The effect of the government balance is positive, albeit insignificant. However, 
when regressing the yearly data, it is highly significant (see robustness tests 
below). This suggests the importance of temporary shocks in determining the 
current account balance, as suggested by Veselkova (2010).  
The institutional quality has a negative effect on the current account. Ac-
cording to the FE model, a 1 point increase in POLITY2 leads to a 0.384 per-
centage-point decrease in the CA balance. When looking at the savings and 
investment channels, higher institutional quality has a positive effect on both 
the savings and investment but this effect is stronger and significant in case of 
investment, where a 1 point increase in institutional quality leads to a 0.802 
percentage point increase in investment. Furthermore, in case of investment 
regression, the effect of POLITY2 is mitigated by the interaction with the level 
of financial development. To estimate the partial effect of POLITY2 on IN-
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VESTMENT conditional on M2GDP (and vice versa), it is of interest to plug in 
some meaningful values of POLITY2 (or M2GDP), such as mean, low and 
high 10 percentile and see whether this effect is significant.  
For low levels of financial development, improvement in institutional qual-
ity leads to higher investment rates, whereas the opposite is true for high values 
of financial development. Note that the effect is significant only at minimum, 
maximum and low 10 percentile.  
Table 4: Effect of POLITY2 on INVESTMENT Conditional on M2GDP 
 Minimum 
Low 10 
percentile 
Mean 
High 10 
percentile 
maximum 
Value of M2GDP 
(12.96, 87.25) 
12.96 19.42 40.25 71.28 87.25 
Effect of POLITY2 
(-10, 10) 
0.636 
(0.372, 0.092) 
0.553 
(0.329, 0.097)
-0.286 
(0.190, 0.137)
-0.113 
(0.077, 0.149)
-0.318 
(0.162, 0.054) 
Table 5: Effect of M2GDP on INVESTMENT conditional on POLITY2 
 Minimum 
Low 10 
percentile 
Mean 
High 10 
percentile 
maximum 
Value of POLITY2 
(-10, 10) 
-10 -4.86 1.52 9.46 10 
Effect of M2GDP 
(12.96, 87.25) 
0.125 
(0.061, 0.043) 
0.059 
(0.036, 0.107)
-0.023 
(0.043, 0.592)
-0.125 
(0.089, 0.166)
-0.132 
(0.093, 0.159) 
 
According to the PCSE model, the effect of POLITY2 on the current account 
balance is of the same magnitude, albeit insignificant. Furthermore, PCSE 
model predicts that a 1 percentage point increase in M2GDP leads to a 0.101 
reduction in the current account balance.  
The implied current accounts (not reported here) suggest that the FE model 
performs better in capturing the current account behavior between 1865 and 
1913. Based on this, the main effect of the financial development on the current 
account comes through the investment channel. 
The results, thus, give some support to the global savings glut hypothesis 
that the excess savings, in this case accumulated by Great Britain, France or 
Germany, were distributed to countries with high degree of financial and insti-
tutional development. A note must be made about the proxy of the financial 
development. Measured as M2GDP, the financial development of Great Britain 
reached only average level, in contrast to Germany or Scandinavian countries 
that had the highest M2GDP. This probably reflects the dominance of stock 
market based financial system in the Great Britain and bank based financial 
system in Germany. Therefore, M2GDP does not seem to capture the high level 
of the British stock and bond market development. It is therefore possible to 
 343
speculate, whether the effect of the financial development would be different if 
measured as stock and bond market development. Unfortunately, such data are 
not available for a broad sample of countries. Second, it must be noted that 
(unlike the U.S. nowadays), the British level of institutional quality did not 
reach the high 10 percentile value.  
As the role of income from foreign investment played a significant role in 
the prewar Britain, the last two columns of tables 1, 2 and 3 report estimation 
results controlling for the initial value of the net foreign assets.15 Due to the 
data unavailability, the sample includes only the following countries: Denmark, 
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The results 
suggest that the net foreign assets were an important determinant of the current 
account balance: a 1 percentage point increase in the NFA increased the current 
account balance by 0.088 percentage points. This effect came through the sav-
ings channel, where a 1 percentage point increase in net foreign assets in-
creased the savings by 0.184 percentage points. The effect of both the institu-
tional quality and the financial development remains negative. This suggests 
that countries with higher levels of institutional quality and financial deepening 
tend to run current account deficits (or lower surpluses). Finally, trade open-
ness has a significant positive effect on the current account: the higher the 
participation in the international trade, the higher the current account balance. 
Other variables are insignificant or marginally significant. For example, the 
effect of the institutional quality on investment has the p-value of 12.9%. The 
difference may be due to the smaller sample size or a stronger effect of the net 
foreign assets on the current account balance than the effect of other variables.  
4.2 Robustness Tests 
In order to examine the robustness of the results at higher frequencies, I reesti-
mated the equation (1) using annual data (not reported here). As the models 
suffered from autocorrelation, I computed White period standard errors robust 
against serial autocorrelation. Based on the criteria listed above, the models of 
interest are FE and PCSE. Furthermore, to control for factors influencing the 
current account in the long-run, I estimated also the between model.  
In general, the results support the regression using 5-year averages. The re-
lationship between the youth dependency and the current account is negative: a 
1 percentage-point increase in youth dependency decreases the current account 
balance by 0.362 percentage points (FE model). Higher institutional quality 
also decreases the current account balance: a 1 point increase in institutional 
quality leads to a 0.328 percentage point decrease in the current account bal-
ance (PCSE model).  
                                                             
15  Note that the AR term was insignificant in both the savings and investment regressions. 
Thus, the interpretation of results relies only on the fixed effects model.  
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Interestingly, the financial development has a significant negative effect on 
both the savings and the investment. A 1 percentage point increase in M2GDP 
decreases the savings by 0.054 to 0.078 percentage point and investment by 
0.051 percentage point. However, in the long-run, the relationship between 
M2GDP and savings is positive: a 1 percentage point increase in M2GDP leads 
to a 0.374 increase in savings.  
The major difference between the regressions using the yearly data and 5-
year averages is in the significance of the government budget balance. Whereas 
it is insignificant in the medium-term, it is significant in the short-term: a 1 
percentage point increase in the government budget balance leads to a 0.182 
percentage point increase in the current account balance.  
The effect of an increase in the government budget balance on savings is of 
a similar magnitude: a 1-percentage point increase in the government budget 
balance increases savings by 0.149 percentage points. This suggests that the 
government budget balance has a non-Ricardian effect on the savings rate, 
where the Ricardian offset in savings is 0.85 percentage point. 
Neither relative income, nor growth rate coefficients were significant in case 
of the current account regression. However, the savings and investment regres-
sions bring more insights into the effect of the economic development. Higher 
relative income leads to higher current account balance: a 1 percentage point 
increase in relative income increases savings by 0.105 to 0.111 percentage 
point. The effect on investment is stronger: a 1 percentage point increase in 
relative income leads to a 0.143 to 0.207 percentage point increase in invest-
ment. As a result, the effect of the relative income on the current account is 
negative, albeit insignificant. In the long-run, relative income is the single most 
important factor that determines both the current account balance and invest-
ment. Here, however, the sign of the coefficient is in line with the theoretical 
predictions: a 1-percentage point increase in economic growth leads to a 4.592 
percentage point decrease in the current account balance and 5.374 increase in 
investment.  
Finally, the trade openness has a positive effect on both savings and invest-
ment: A 1 percentage point increase leads to a 0.265 percentage point increase 
in savings and a 0.301 percentage point increase in investment. This suggests 
that an increasing participation in international trade leads to (1) an increase in 
savings due to revenue generated by trade, and (2) an increase in investment in 
the profitable export-oriented businesses.  
To test the robustness of the results, I used two further proxies of institu-
tional quality. First, I used constraint on the executive as a proxy of the risk of 
expropriation (not reported here). Surprisingly, its effect was insignificant. 
Second, I used SPREAD variable (Ferguson and Schularick 2006), which 
measures the difference between the yield on a country’s bond and the yield on 
British consols. Clemens and Williamson (2004) used SPREAD as a proxy of 
investment risk not explained by economic fundamentals. There are small 
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discrepancies compared to the base regression. The effect of the financial de-
velopment is negative at all levels of SPREAD. However, the effect of institu-
tional quality measured as SPREAD is different from the base results. An in-
crease in institutional quality, i.e. a decrease in spread, decreases the CA 
balance in countries with low levels of financial deepening. On the contrary, it 
increases the CA balance in financially developed countries (here, however, the 
effect is insignificant). The difference in the effect of SPREAD may come from 
two sources. First, the sample is smaller and does not include developed Euro-
pean countries, such as Great Britain, France or Germany.16 Second, although 
the differences in spreads signal the creditworthiness of the country, it is debat-
able whether they are solely the result of differences in underlying institutional 
quality or whether these differences capture also the differences in the macro-
economic fundamentals.17 
5. Medium-Term Determinants of 
the Current Account Balance, 1970-2007 
This section deals with the medium-term determinants of the CA balance dur-
ing the period of 1970-2007. To capture the medium-term effects, 5-year non-
overlapping averages are used. For the last period of 2005-2007, a 3-year aver-
age is used. To check the robustness of the results and to capture the long-term 
and short-term determinants of the current account, yearly data and cross-
section averages are used (see section on the robustness of the results). The 
dataset covers 107 countries (21 developed, 86 developing). The complete list 
of variables and sources is available upon request.  
Between 1970 and 2007, the current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP ranged from the minimum of -240 to the maximum of 99, with the mean 
CA balance equal to -2.571. To capture the sensitivity of results to outliers, I 
perform robustness tests, where I exclude all countries with the CAGDP higher 
than 10 or lower than -10 percent of GDP (see robustness tests). None of the 
correlations of explanatory variables is significantly higher than 50%. The 
highest correlation of 54.2% is between the capital openness (KAOPEN) and 
real per capita income relative to the average real per capita income of the 
high-income OECD countries (RELYOECD).  
5.1 Estimation Results 
Estimation results are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8. As Ito and Chinn (2007) 
documented different determinants of the CA for developed and developing 
                                                             
16  SPREAD sample: ARG, AUS, CAN, DEN, ITA, NOR, RUS, SPA, SWE, USA. 
17  Ferguson and Schularick (2006) provide some evidence for the former, whereas Flandreau 
and Zumer (2004) provide the evidence for the latter.  
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countries, I re-run the regression also for various country groups (devel-
oped/developing/developing excluding Africa). 
Table 6: Current Account Regressions, 1970-2007 
FD proxy M3GDP SIZE PBBM 
Model FE twoways FE twoways FE twoways 
C 3.564 (6.808, 0.601) 
15.603 
(7.146, 0.031) 
10.436 
(10.118, 0.306) 
RELYOECD 0.039 (0.043, 0.366) 
-0.051 
(0.050, 0.312) 
-0.144 
(0.046, 0.003) 
POLITY2 -0.217 (0.172, 0.209) 
-0.185 
(0.203, 0.364) 
0.502 
(0.214, 0.022) 
FD -0.001 (0.032, 0.967) 
-0.064 
(0.030, 0.035) 
0.169 
(0.063, 0.009) 
KAOPEN 1.451 (0.794, 0.069) 
-0.449 
(0.898, 0.618) 
0.292 
(0.833, 0.727) 
GOVBAL 0.341 (0.110, 0.002) 
0.359 
(0.194, 0.067) 
0.647 
(0.364, 0.080) 
NFAIN 0.001 (0.002, 0.544) 
0.038 
(0.031, 0.224) 
-0.002 
(0.021, 0.904) 
DEPR -0.040 (0.074, 0.590) 
-0.172 
(0.085, 0.046) 
-0.195 
(0.148, 0.190) 
POLITY2*FD 0.000 (0.003, 0.938) 
0.003 
(0.002, 0.216) 
-0.017 
(0.008, 0.035) 
POLITY2*KAOPEN -0.055 (0.081, 0.499) 
-0.021 
(0.083, 0.805) 
-0.044 
(0.122, 0.721) 
KAOPEN*FD -0.026 (0.008, 0.002) 
0.004 
(0.007, 0.558) 
-0.015 
(0.024, 0.532) 
TRADEGDP -0.014 (0.032, 0.668) 
0.060 
(0.036, 0.096) 
0.082 
(0.042, 0.056) 
ECONGROWTH -0.201 (0.131, 0.128) 
-0.364 
(0.260, 0.165) 
-0.244 
(0.280, 0.386) 
PBBM*GOVBAL   -0.008 (0.004, 0.084) 
Adj. R-squared 0.606 0.710 0.758 
Countries 107 68 43 
Observations 409 199 136 
Time spam 1970-2007 1980-2007 1990-2007 
 
First, contrary to the stages of economic development hypothesis, there is a 
negative relationship between the relative income per capita and the current 
account: a 1-percentage point increase in per capita relative to the OECD aver-
age leads to 0.144 percentage point decrease in the current account balance. 
This effect is driven by the significant positive effect of RELYOECD on in-
vestment (0.071 to 0.072). The sign of the economic growth coefficient is 
negative as expected but insignificant. Looking at the savings and investment 
regressions sheds more light on the effect of economic growth on the current 
account. Faster economic growth increases both the savings and investment but 
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the effect is stronger and more significant in case of investment. These results 
suggest that both the richer and the faster growing economies tend to run cur-
rent account deficits.  
Table 7: Savings Regressions, 1970-2007. 
FD proxy M3GDP SIZE PBBM 
Model FE country FE country FE country 
C 17.232 (7.995, 0.032) 
35.126 
(9.147, 0.000) 
32.143 
(16.084, 0.049) 
RELYOECD 0.074 (0.042, 0.081) 
0.027 
(0.049, 0.581) 
-0.045 
(0.037, 0.231) 
POLITY2 0.118 (0.190, 0.534) 
-0.369 
(0.265, 0.167) 
0.619 
(0.329, 0.064) 
FD 0.099 (0.038, 0.011) 
-0.056 
(0.036, 0.129) 
0.138 
(0.074, 0.065) 
KAOPEN 1.734 (1.087, 0.112) 
-1.032 
(1.298, 0.428) 
1.949 
(1.680, 0.250) 
GOVBAL 0.496 (0.151, 0.001) 
0.503 
(0.315, 0.114) 
0.671 
(0.276, 0.017) 
NFAIN 0.019 (0.015, 0.188) 
0.022 
(0.023, 0.335) 
0.017 
(0.024, 0.482) 
DEPR -0.041 (0.078, 0.602) 
-0.185 
(0.100, 0.068) 
-0.194 
(0.239, 0.421) 
POLITY2*FD -0.002 (0.004, 0.604) 
0.005 
(0.003, 0.058) 
-0.019 
(0.010, 0.065) 
POLITY2*KAOPEN 0.110 (0.103, 0.291) 
0.035 
(0.130, 0.792) 
-0.190 
(0.150, 0.210) 
KAOPEN*FD -0.057 (0.017, 0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.010, 0.888) 
-0.012 
(0.037, 0.735) 
TRADEGDP -0.004 (0.038, 0.919) 
0.019 
(0.052, 0.721) 
-0.015 
(0.044, 0.743) 
ECONGROWTH 0.262 (0.111, 0.019) 
0.378 
(0.340, 0.269) 
0.490 
(0.304, 0.111) 
PBBM*GOVBAL   -0.008 (0.005, 0.114) 
Adj. R-squared 0.784 0.786 0.875 
Countries 95 63 41 
Observations 358 176 127 
Time span 1970-2007 1980-2007 1990-2007 
 
Second, there is a positive relationship between the government budget balance 
and the current account. A 1 percentage point increase in the budget balance 
leads to a 0.341 to 0.647 percentage point increase in the current account. 
However, this positive effect of the budget balance is mitigated by its interac-
tion with the public bond market capitalization. These results give support to 
the twin deficits hypothesis. The effect of an increase in the government budget 
balance on savings is also positive: a 1 percentage point increase leads to 0.496 
to 0.671 percentage point increase in savings rate. This suggests that the gov-
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ernment budget balance has a non-Ricardian effect on the savings rate, where 
the Ricardian offset in savings is 0.329 to 0.504 percentage point.  
Table 8: Investment Regressions, 1970-2007 
FD proxy M3GDP SIZE PBBM 
Model FE twoways FE twoways FE country 
C 14.069 (5.898, 0.018) 
12.588 
(4.345, 0.005) 
29.125 
(8.240, 0.001) 
RELYOECD 0.071 (0.026, 0.007) 
0.072 
(0.036, 0.050) 
0.035 
(0.035, 0.310) 
POLITY2 0.365 (0.161, 0.024) 
-0.117 
(0.128, 0.363) 
0.014 
(0.187, 0.939) 
FD 0.061 (0.031, 0.050) 
0.040 
(0.023, 0.083) 
-0.023 
(0.064, 0.718) 
KAOPEN -0.005 (0.604, 0.993) 
0.060 
(0.649, 0.927) 
1.490 
(0.749, 0.050) 
GOVBAL -0.053 (0.088, 0.546) 
-0.096 
(0.112, 0.396) 
0.251 
(0.324, 0.441) 
NFAIN 0.003 (0.002, 0.175) 
0.018 
(0.011, 0.088) 
0.009 
(0.013, 0.521) 
DEPR -0.051 (0.063, 0.414) 
0.005 
(0.056, 0.925) 
-0.113 
(0.123, 0.363) 
POLITY2*FD -0.006 (0.003, 0.064) 
0.001 
(0.002, 0.715) 
-0.003 
(0.009, 0.772) 
POLITY2*KAOPEN 0.066 (0.045, 0.143) 
0.060 
(0.055, 0.272) 
-0.142 
(0.092, 0.126) 
KAOPEN*FD -0.007 (0.009, 0.450) 
-0.009 
(0.006, 0.116) 
-0.006 
(0.019, 0.749) 
TRADEGDP 0.073 (0.027, 0.007) 
0.011 
(0.046, 0.813) 
-0.037 
(0.037, 0.327) 
ECONGROWTH 0.463 (0.125, 0.000) 
0.804 
(0.238, 0.001) 
0.631 
(0.269, 0.021) 
PBBM*GOVBAL   -0.003 (0.005, 0.516) 
Adj. R-squared 0.708 0.809 0.848 
Countries 107 68 43 
Observations 452 201 138 
Time span 1970-2007 1975-2007 1990-2007 
 
These results are in line with Chinn and Ito (2007a), where a one percentage 
point increase in the budget balance increases the CA balance by 0.1-0.49 
percentage point for industrialized countries for the period of 1971 through 
2004; and Ito (2009), where a one percentage point increase in the budget bal-
ance raises the current account balance by 0.10-0.49 percentage point for in-
dustrialized countries. The role of fiscal balance was documented also for oil-
exporting countries (Morsy 2009) and for Middle East and North Africa coun-
tries Aristovnik (2007) at higher frequencies. On the other hand, the results 
stand in contrast to Ito and Chinn (2007), where the budget variable is not 
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statistically significant. As this paper estimates the same model, it is of interest 
to discuss possible explanations. First, the sample size, its composition and the 
time span might play the role. Whereas the analysis of Ito and Chinn (2007) 
encompasses the sample of 19 industrialized and 70 developing countries for 
the period of 1986 through 2005, this paper encompasses the sample of 21 
developed and 86 developing countries for the period of 1970 through 2007. 
The longer time span enables to include more post-communist or emerging 
economies in the sample. Furthermore, the longer time span enables to better 
capture the global imbalances phenomenon related to the past decade. Finally, 
the difference might stem from the data specification. Whereas Ito and Chinn 
(2007) converted all variables into deviations from their GDP-weighted world 
mean, this analysis uses unconverted data. 
Third, there is a negative relationship between the dependency rate and the 
current account balance as expected. A 1 percentage point increase in the de-
pendency rate leads to a 0.172 percentage point decrease in the current account. 
This effect is significant only when SIZE is used as a proxy of the financial 
development.  
Fourth, the effect of initial levels of net foreign assets on the current account 
balance is insignificant. However, it has a significant positive effect on invest-
ment: a 1 percentage point increase in the NFA leads to a 0.018 percentage 
point increase in investment.  
TRADEGDP, a variable emphasized by the policy-makers has a positive ef-
fect on the CA balance. The higher the participation in the international trade, 
the higher the CA balance.  
The effect of the terms of trade volatility (TOTSD) was tested separately 
because the data availability draws the sample size down to the maximum of 79 
(not reported here). The effect is insignificant.  
Finally, the estimation results give some support also to the savings glut hy-
pothesis. Size of the financial market has a significant negative effect on the 
current account balance: a 1 point increase in SIZE decreases the CA balance 
by 0.064 percentage point.18 Two proxies of financial development (M3GDP 
and PBBM) have a significant interaction term; the former with the capital 
openness, the latter with the institutional quality and the government budget 
balance. M3GDP is used as a proxy of the financial deepening. Its effect on the 
CA balance is positive, albeit insignificant, for countries with low level of 
institutional quality and low capital openness such as China. On the other hand, 
                                                             
18  As SIZE is measured as the sum of the stock market capitalization (STOCK) and 
(CREDIT), it is of interest to examine the separate effect of these two variables to see, 
which of the components of SIZE is driving the results for the regression with SIZE (avail-
able upon request). Both variables have a negative effect on the CA balance but whereas the 
effect of STOCK is insignificant, the effect of CREDIT is significant: a 1-percentage point 
increase in CREDIT decreases the CA balance by 0.074 percentage points. 
 350
an increase in M3GDP has a negative effect on the CA balance in countries 
with the high levels of both the capital openness and institutional quality. Here, 
the effect is significant. Similarly, an increase in the capital openness reduces 
the CA balance for countries with high levels of financial development (meas-
ured as M3GDP) and average to high levels of institutional quality.  
The further proxy of interest is the size of the public bond market (PBBM), 
as the ability to generate safe financial instruments has been emphasized as the 
main reason of the U.S. current account deficit.19 The effect of PBBM on the 
CA balance is positive but this effect is mitigated by its interaction with the 
institutional quality and the government budget balance. At low 10 percentile 
values of KAOPEN, POLITY and GOVBAL, a 1-percentage increase in 
PBBM decreases the CA balance by 0.287 percentage points. On the other 
hand, the effect of PBBM at high 10 percentile values is positive, albeit insig-
nificant. In countries with high institutional quality, high level of capital open-
ness and high budget deficits (such as USA), PBBM has a negative effect on 
the CA balance. However, this effect is insignificant. The effect of POLITY 
yields more interesting results. In countries with high level of capital openness 
and large public bond markets, a 1 percentage point increase in POLITY2 
decreases the CA balance by 0.793 percentage points.  
Which of the models is the best? If looking at the adjusted R-squared, the 
model with PBBM as the proxy of the financial outperforms others, as it ex-
plains 75.8 percent of the variance in the CAGDP. Model with proxy of the 
overall size of the financial sector follows. When comparing models, it is also 
of interest to look at the current accounts predicted by each model. The implied 
current accounts with two standard error banks, which provide an approximate 
95% forecast intervals suggest that SIZE model predicts the behavior of the 
U.S. and Japanese CA balance the best, although it underestimates German CA 
balance for the period of 2005-07. 
Here, a note must be made about the multicollinearity problem. The largest 
VIF in SIZE regression was reported for the interaction term of POLITY2 and 
SIZE (13.297). The mean VIF was 4.479. As none of the interaction terms was 
significant, I re-estimated the regression without interaction terms (available 
upon request). This reduced the mean VIF to 1.765. The largest VIF was re-
ported for relative income (3.188). Dropping interaction terms did not signifi-
cantly change magnitude or the sign of coefficients with a single exception. 
The SIZE coefficient was reduced from -0.064 to -0.036 and its significance 
increased from p-value of 3.47% to 0.62%. Furthermore, the dependency ratio 
did not retain its significance: the p-value increased from 4.6% to 13.26%. 
                                                             
19  Here it must be noted that the U.S. PBBM reaches only average values compared to, for 
example, Japan, the country with the largest public bond market. To control for the possible 
outlier effect, I estimated the pooled OLS PBBM model with the dummy for Japan. This 
dummy was insignificant.  
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Similarly, dropping the insignificant interaction terms from the current account 
regression using M3GDP as the proxy of the financial development reduced the 
largest VIF from 12.036 to 5.282 (interaction term of KAOPEN and M3GDP) 
and the mean VIF from 3.788 to 2.310. This did not lead to any significant 
changes in the magnitude, sign or significance of the coefficients. However, it 
is not possible to see more sensitivity tests because dropping significant inter-
action terms would lead to the loss of information.  
Ito and Chinn (2007) documented different determinants of the CA for de-
veloped and developing countries. Therefore, I re-estimate the model for coun-
tries grouped by their stage of development (available upon request). This 
alters the results. In case of the developed countries, the most interesting 
change is in the effect of the government budget balance. Although it remains 
positive, it is insignificant. On the other hand, the interaction terms of the fi-
nancial development with POLITY2 and KAOPEN are significant in all cases, 
except of model with M3GDP (the p-value of the interaction term of M3GDP 
and KAOPEN is 18.2%). 
Here, however, there are several changes. First, the effect of SIZE condi-
tional on POLITY2 and KAOPEN remains negative. These findings are in line 
with the global savings glut hypothesis. However, the effect of KAOPEN con-
ditional on SIZE and POLITY2 contradicts the predictions of the global sav-
ings glut hypothesis. For developed countries, an increase in the capital open-
ness decreases the CA balance in countries with smallest financial markets and 
increases the CA balance in countries with the largest financial markets sup-
ported by high quality institutions. These findings contradict the global savings 
glut hypothesis, which assumes that countries with the most developed finan-
cial markets and with high levels of capital openness tend to run current ac-
count deficits. Indeed, this model overestimates the CA balance of the United 
States for the period of 2005-07 (not reported here).  
PBBM has a significant negative effect on the CA balance for countries with 
low levels of KAOPEN, POLITY2 and GOVBAL. The effect of KAOPEN 
conditional on PBBM and POLITY2 is as expected: negative for countries with 
high levels of POLITY2. However, there is a significant change in the effect of 
POLITY2, which is positive at all levels of PBBM and KAOPEN. From the 
policy perspective, such finding is irrelevant for the United States, whose score 
on the institutional quality is the highest, similarly to most of the developed 
countries. Therefore, it is not possible to increase the CA balance by improving 
the institutional quality.  
Results are altered also for the models re-estimated for the developing coun-
tries (excluding Africa). There is a mixed evidence on the effect of the relative 
income per capita, which ranges from the positive effect of 0.142 to the nega-
tive effect of -0.408. The effect of the GOVBAL is significantly positive: a 1-
percentage point increase in GOVBAL increase the CA balance by 0.513 per-
centage points. These results also suggest that the government balance is more 
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important in influencing the behavior of the CA balance in developing coun-
tries. The twin deficits hypothesis thus fits developing world better than the 
developed world. The effect of SIZE and PBBM conditional on POLITY2 and 
KAOPEN is in line with predictions of the global savings glut hypothesis. 
Thus, the results suggest that an increase in the size of the financial market 
would reduce the CA surplus in developing countries. This result is in contrast 
to the findings of Ito and Chinn (2007), where increase in the size of financial 
markets induces an increase in the CA balance in developing countries. The 
difference in results may stem from the difference in the sample size and time 
span (see above). The only result supportive of Ito and Chinn’s (2007) conclu-
sion about the positive effect of financial development on the CA balance is the 
effect of POLITY2 conditional on PBBM and KAOPEN, which suggests that 
an increase in the institutional quality would increase the CA balance in coun-
tries with small public bond markets and low level of capital openness, such as 
China.  
When looking at models estimated for developed and developing countries 
(excluding Africa), PBBM model has the highest adjusted R-squared (0.871, 
0.898 and 0.871 respectively). In case of the United States, PBBM model 
seems to best capture the CA development (not reported here). PBBM model 
provides the best prediction of the Chinese, Japanese and German CA as well.  
5.2 Robustness Tests 
To check the sensitivity of results to various proxies of financial development, 
I re-estimate the panel regression with alternative measures of financial devel-
opment, such as stock market total value traded (SMTV) as a ratio to GDP and 
stock market turnover (SMTO) as a ratio to GDP to control for the financial 
market activity and the net interest margin (MARGIN) and bank’s overhead 
costs as a share of their total assets (OVERHEAD) to control for the efficiency 
of the banking market. In the base sample, only one of the financial develop-
ment proxies was significant: a 1 percentage point decrease in OVERHEAD 
decreases the CA balance by 1.209 percentage points. This suggests that the 
better the cost performance of the banking sector, i.e. the lower the bank’s 
overhead costs as a share of its total assets, the lower the CA balance. The 
relative income had a significant negative effect on the current account balance: 
a 1 percentage point increase in the relative income leads to a 0.114 to 0.158 
percentage point decrease in the current account balance. Finally, the budget 
balance had a significant positive effect on the current account balance: a 1 
percentage point increase in the budget balance increases the current account 
balance by 0.398 to 0.509 percentage points. None of the interaction terms was 
significant.  
To check if the baseline results are sensitive to outliers, I excluded all ob-
servations for which the dependent variable was lower than -10 or greater than 
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10 (not reported here). This reduced the sample size to the maximum of 69. 
Some of the coefficients that had been significant before did not retain their 
statistical significance. This holds especially for the government budget bal-
ance, which was significant only in case when PBBM was used as a proxy of 
the FD. This is probably due to smaller positive effect of GOVBAL on SAV-
INGS than in the base sample. On the other hand, the coefficients on the finan-
cial development, as well as its interactions with KAOPEN and POLITY2 
remained virtually unchanged even after excluding the extreme values of 
CAGDP. Finally, the economic growth is insignificant.  
In order to examine the robustness of the results to the choice of data fre-
quency, I reestimated the panel regression using annual data and cross-section 
averages. Using the annual data, I reestimated the model and also included 
lagged logarithms of the real effective exchange rate (not reported here). In 
general, results are similar to those using 5-year averages. More important role 
is played by the real economic growth and the government budget balance, 
suggesting the importance of income shocks. Net foreign assets have a signifi-
cant positive effect on the CA balance in the short-run. The effect of the finan-
cial development remains unchanged when proxied as M3GDP, SIZE and 
PBBM. Once again, PBBM model has the highest adjusted R-squared (0.76) 
and predicts that an increase in the capital openness decreases the CA balance 
in countries with largest public bond markets supported by high-quality institu-
tions.  
Cross-section regressions (not reported here) suggest that in the long-run, 
the behavior of the CA balance is determined by different factors. The fiscal 
balance has a significant positive effect on the CA balance, however, this effect 
is mitigated by its interaction with PBBM. The effect of the financial develop-
ment on the CA balance is positive in the long-run but this effect is mitigated 
by the interaction with POLITY2. The single exception is PBBM model, where 
the negative effect of PBBM is further magnified by its interaction with the 
fiscal balance. Nevertheless, the model suggests that countries with high-
quality institutions and developed financial markets tend to run CA deficit (or 
smaller CA surplus). In contrast to the short- and medium-run models, the 
between model supports the stages of development hypothesis that poorer and 
faster growing economies tend to borrow against their future income and run 
the CA deficit. Finally, the model suggests that being an oil exporter increases 
the CA balance by 3.068 to 6.933 percentage points. On the other hand, the 
USA dummy is significant in 4 out of 8 models and suggests a decrease in the 
CA balance by 4.878 to 6.168 percentage points. These results suggest that 
there is some unexplained factor unique to the United States. Originally, the 
USA dummy was included in the model to control for the significantly larger 
size of the U.S. financial market relative to the rest of the world. However, this 
unexplained factor might capture broader phenomena, such as the specific 
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position of the United States in the world economy or the perceived “safe ha-
ven” position of U.S. financial instruments.  
Ito and Chinn (2007) document that their estimation results are sensitive to 
the inclusion or exclusion of African countries. Therefore, I re-estimated the 
model (not reported here). Exclusion of African countries did not significantly 
alter the results. The major change is in the significance of the interaction term 
of SIZE and POLITY2, which makes the results more similar to those of de-
veloped countries. Second, I re-estimated the model without oil-exporting 
countries. This did not significantly alter the results. 
Finally, I re-estimated the regression using XCONST (constraint on the ex-
ecutive) as a proxy of the institutional quality (not reported here). This vari-
ables is used as a proxy of the risk of expropriation. Similarly to the period of 
1865 to 1913, the effect of XCONST and its interactions is insignificant, except 
of PBBM regression, where the results are similar to the base regression using 
PBBM as the proxy of the financial development and POLITY2 as the proxy of 
the institutional quality.  
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
This paper empirically tested the medium-term determinants of the current 
account in two eras of globalization. The main aim was to examine whether the 
redistribution of excess savings was driven by the same factors. The compari-
son has yielded several similarities. Thus, although the excess savings were 
produced by the developed part of the world during the first era of globaliza-
tion and has been produced (mostly) by the developing part of the world in the 
past decade, this excess savings were redistributed along similar lines to rela-
tively rich countries with developed financial markets, high quality institutions 
and high proportion of dependent persons. An important role was played by the 
government budget balance, albeit only in the short-run between 1865 and 
1913. However, there were also several differences, especially in the effect of 
the economic growth. 
In general, the effect of the relative income per capita was negative for both 
periods. A 1 percentage point increase in the relative income per capita de-
creased the CA balance by 0.115 to 0.128 percentage points in the pre-War 
period and by 0.144 percentage points in the post-BW period. These results 
support the Lassudrie-Duchêne et al. (1990) version of the stages of develop-
ment hypothesis. On the other hand, the effect of the economic growth was 
different during two examined periods. Whereas in the pre-War period faster-
growing economies tended to run the CA surplus, the opposite was true for the 
post-BW period.  
Dependency rates played some role in both periods, suggesting the impor-
tance of the “intergenerational transfer” (Taylor and Williamson 1994). Thus, 
whereas in the pre-War period the excess savings were transferred from old 
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savers in the Old World to young savers in the New World, in the past decade, 
the excess savings were transferred from old savers in China and other East 
Asian countries to young savers in various parts of the world.  
In the pre-War period, the government budget balance is insignificant in the 
medium-run. However, its effect in the short-run is positive, as predicted by the 
twin deficits hypothesis. This suggests the importance of the short-run shocks 
to income (Veselkova 2010). In the post-BW period, the government budget 
balance has a positive effect on the CA balance but this effect holds only for 
developing countries.  
Finally, this analysis focused also on the effect of the financial development 
and its interaction with the institutional quality and capital openness. In the pre-
War period, a 1 point increase in the institutional quality reduced the CA bal-
ance by 0.384 percentage points. The results suggested that the financial devel-
opment played an important role as well: an increase in the financial deepening 
reduced the current account balance. The two variables had a joint effect on the 
investment rates. In countries with low-quality institutions, further financial 
deepening led to an increase in investment rates. The opposite was true for 
countries with high-quality institutions. Similarly, improvement in the quality 
of institutions led to an increase in the investment rates in less financially de-
veloped economies and to a decrease in more financially developed countries.  
Here, it must be noted that the comparison is complicated by the data avail-
ability for the pre-War period. There, financial deepening was measured as 
monetary aggregate M2 as a percentage of GDP. For the post-Bretton-Woods 
period, the financial deepening was measured as monetary aggregate M3 as a 
percentage of GDP. However, other proxies of the financial development, such 
as the size of the financial market, size of the public bond market or the effi-
ciency of the banking sector yielded more interesting results. As both the Great 
Britain in the pre-War period and the United States in the post-BW period 
reached only average levels of financial development if measured as monetary 
aggregate M2 or M3, it is reasonable to assume that the effect of the financial 
development on the CA balance in the pre-War period would be different if 
measured as the stock or the bond market development. Some insights are 
provided by the analysis of the post-BW period. 
Size of the financial market, measured as the sum of the stock market capi-
talization and the private credit creation, has a significant negative effect on the 
CA balance. These results hold, whether looking at all countries or developed 
and developing countries separately. Thus, the results support the common 
view that the United States attracts capital from the rest of the world because its 
financial market is the deepest and the most liquid. Similar results were ob-
tained when examining the efficiency of the banking sector.  
The effect of the capital openness provides mixed evidence to the global 
savings glut hypothesis. An increase in the capital openness increases the cur-
rent account in developed countries with the largest financial markets and the 
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high-quality institutions. This is in contrast to the claims that more financially 
developed countries with high level of capital openness absorb the capital from 
abroad and therefore tend to run the current account deficit. In developing 
countries, the effect of the capital openness is insignificant. These results do 
not give much support to the claim that the capital account liberalization in 
developing countries might reduce their CA surpluses.  
Based on the above, it is possible to make three conclusions. First, the cur-
rent account balances were determined by similar factors in both eras of the 
globalization. Second, the global savings glut and twin deficits hypothesis are 
not mutually exclusive (see also Ito and Chinn 2007). In the medium-run, how-
ever, the twin deficits hypothesis seems to hold only for developing countries. 
On the other hand, the effect of the financial development is universal for both 
developed and developing countries, whether measured as the overall size or 
efficiency of the financial market. These results support the view that countries 
with more developed financial markets tend to be capital importers. However, 
the effect of capital openness is in contrast to the predictions of the global 
savings glut hypothesis. In developing countries, the capital openness does not 
seem to play any role in determining the current account balance in the me-
dium-run, whereas in developed countries its effect is positive for countries 
with large financial markets and high degree of capital openness. These results 
bring us to the third conclusion, the policy recommendations. Based on the 
above it is possible to argue against the oft-claimed argument that capital ac-
count liberalization in East Asia would reduce the large current surpluses in the 
region. Rather, these countries should opt for policies that would enhance their 
financial development. In case of China, these policies might include the priva-
tization through the stock market or further banking sector reforms. Loosening 
of fiscal policy would have the similar effect in both the short- and the me-
dium-run. Changes in the one-child policy might reduce the current account 
surplus as well. Finally, the long-run regressions suggest that there is some 
unexplained factor related to the United States. This factor may either be re-
lated to the size of the U.S. financial market relative to other countries or to the 
broad phenomenon related to the specific position of the United States or its 
currency in the international economy.  
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